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Plessy v. Ferguson - 100 Years Later
Honorable John Minor Wisdom"
I am deeply honored to speak to the graduating class of the College of
Law at Washington and Lee University. The Lee Chapel, the Lee House,
the line of beautiful colonnaded buildings, the lovely campus, the Pines,
where my two brothers and I lived when we were students here, the Lewis
Building, the Powell Building, and the many great changes that have taken
place since I came here as a freshman in September 1921 - have all stirred
my heart.**
This attractive group of graduates has helped increase the quality of life
at the law school and improved the school's standing in the legal community.
It has earned you an escape from the generalizations for success in life and
in law which are so often tediously expressed at law graduation exercises.
We are lawyers. We shall talk law. We shall talk about Plessy v. Ferguson'
in which the United States Supreme Court gave its blessing to the "separate
but equal" doctrine 100 years ago, May 18, 1896. That doctrine served as
a thin disguise for Jim Crowism until Brown v. Board of Education2 on
May 17, 1954, demolished it, although Brown does not specifically overrule
* United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The following is based on an
address given by Judge Wisdom at Washington and Lee University School of Law's 140th
Commencement Exercises on May 21, 1995.
** I have had a long connection with Washington and Lee University. My father came
up from New Orleans to enter Washington College in 1868. Robert E. Lee was president of
the college. Father was only fourteen at the time, too young to have served in what we
always did call and still call "The War." Most of his classmates were Confederate veterans
whose talk I listened to as a child when his classmates passed through New Orleans and
stopped by the house for drinks or dinner. Curiously, my wife's father was at VMI when my
father was at Washington College. My wife Bonnie, christened Charles Stewart Mathews,
was born on a sugar plantation in LaFourche Parish, near New Orleans. Her great-
grandfather attended Liberty Hall, before the name was changed to Washington College.
Bonnie was graduated from Sweetbriar. We have been married for nearly sixty-five years
and have lived continuously in New Orleans during that time except for four years when I
was in uniform in World War II.
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Plessy.3 Indeed, "separate but equal" seems to comply with the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; separate but unequal seems
to equate with discrimination. We shall talk about Justice John Marshall
Harlan's dissent in Plessy. We shall talk about Albion Winegar Tourg6e, the
brilliant but erratic lawyer, crusading carpetbagger, and reconstruction
novelist who brain-trusted the losing anti-Jim Crowism committee of black
plaintiffs.4 It was Tourg6e who supplied the dissenting justice in Plessy,
John Marshall Harlan, with the most powerful maxim in American law:
"Our Constitution is color-blind. "I
Plessy v. Ferguson has always fascinated me. I gave a talk on it in one
of the Dreyfous Lecture Series at Tulane in 1972. I called it Plessy Rides
Again. I never published it because I was not satisfied with my footnotes.
That was before Lofgren's fine work on Plessy and Owen Fiss's brilliant
and balanced analysis of the case in the recently published Volume VIII of
the Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court.7 Two years after my talk,
my wife gave a lecture on Albion W. Tourg~e to her literary club, the
Quarante Club, a women's club well older than a hundred years. She called
her talk The Crusading Carpetbagger.! Bonnie tracked down the source of
Justice Harlan's powerful maxim by reading Tourg6e's novels. Justice John
Harlan's full statement reads: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
3. Twice, after Brown, Justice William 0. Douglas cited Plessy with approval:
Gomperts v. Chase, 404 U.S. 1237, 1239-40 (1971) (denial of motion for preliminary injunc-
tion); Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1028 (Douglas, J., dissenting from affirmance).
4. Contrary to the growing custom of revisionist historians, the word "creole" in
Louisiana was reserved for whites who are descendants of French and Spanish colonists and
Americans. The free gens de couleur were frequently well off financially and well educated.
As a class, they assumed leadership of the early civil rights movement in Louisiana, and their
descendants still do, whether called "creoles," "blacks," or "African Americans."
5. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 557, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLEssY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
(1987).
7. OwEN M. Fss, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 (1993)
(Vol. VIII - The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United
States).
8. See generally OTTO H. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION
WINEGAR TOURGAE (1965). This biography was the result of a long and extensive effort by
Professor Olsen to locate letters and papers by Tourg~e which finally turned up in old boxes
at Chautauqua. The boxes included correspondence with Emma (Mrs. Tourg~e), Louis
Martinet, Daniel Desdunes, and other members of the Louisiana committee, as well as
clippings from old newspapers and many other papers.
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citizens are equal before the law."9 This quote is a paraphrase of Tourg~e's
metaphor in his briefs in Plessy: "Justice is pictured blind and her daughter,
the Law, ought at least to be color-blind." Bonnie commented in her paper:
"I am probably unique in that I have carefully read seven of Tourg~e's
novels all the way through, and I discovered that Tourg~e, like Mozart, was
simply repeating himself.° These famous words first issued from the mouth
of Hesden Le Moyne, the hero of Tourg~e's Bricks Without Straw."
Professor Fiss generously repeated this comment in a footnote."
Certainly at some point I should refer to the fact that Edmund Wilson,
probably the leading American writing critic of the midtwentieth century,
wrote that Tourg~e's A Fool's Errand12 "was received as a sensation in its
day and it ought to be an historical classic in ours."13 Again, "Tourg~e was
a special case. He was a Northerner who resembled the Southerners: in his
insolence, his independence, his readiness to accept a challenge, his
recklessness and ineptitude in practical matters, his romantic and chivalrous
view of the world in which he was living."14
Albion Winegar Tourgde was of French Huguenot stock on his father's
side and of sturdy Swiss stock on his mother's side. His parents moved
from the Hudson Valley to the little town of Lee, Massachusetts, and then
to Williamstown, Ohio where Albion was born in 1838. When he was
fourteen, his mother had died and his father had married again. He took
himself off to live with a Winegar in Lee, Massachusetts. At about this time
he lost an eye as a result of a playmate's exploding a percussion cap. He
later returned to his father's home and eventually, at twenty-one, attended
the University of Rochester.
When the War began, Tourg6e promptly joined the 27th New York
Volunteers. He carried off to war with him the Greek Testament and a
volume of Cicero's, and later, when taken prisoner, he studied Spanish and
Cervantes' Don Quixote. His regiment moved into Virginia where, he
wrote, there was plundering to a shameful degree. His objections marked
9. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, I., dissenting).
10. Bonnie Wisdom, The Crusading Carpetbagger 25 (unpublished manuscript on file
with the author).
11. Fiss, supra note 7, at 354 n.10.
12. ALBION W. TOURGAE, A FOOL'S ERRAND: A NOVEL OF THE SouTm DURING
RECONSTRUCTION (Torchbook 1961) (1879).
13. EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERI-
cAN CIVIL WAR 536 (1962). Wilson was not interested in the law: Plessy is not mentioned
in the chapter on Tourg~e.
14. Id. at 537.
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the beginning of a growing compassion for the South and a lasting objection
to Union plundering.
On July 4, 1861, in the first battle of Bull Run, he was severely injured
by a retreating battery heading for the rear at such speed that Tourg~e could
not get out of the way. He was out of action for a year and never fully re-
covered from the injury to his back. He returned to the fight, was wounded
and hospitalized again. He returned again, fought in many engagements,
was captured and imprisoned for four months. Freed in May 1863 in an
exchange of prisoners, he went to Ohio and married his youthful sweetheart,
Emma Lodoiska Kibourne. He went back to war a third time and sustained
injuries that took him out of the war. When he was ordered to report for
possible transfer to the Invalid Corps, he resigned. Shortly before the end
of the war, however, he was negotiating for a commission in a Negro
regiment.
He had received a law degree at Rochester University, and after the
war, he and Emma moved to North Carolina in 1865. He participated in
efforts to bring that state back into the Union. He became active in the
political life of North Carolina. He was a delegate to the new constitutional
convention and was influential in shaping a new constitution. He was suc-
cessful in getting the convention to authorize a codification of all of the laws
of the state. He failed to be elected to Congress but was elected a superior
judge in Greensboro, with jurisdiction over eight counties. During his years
on the bench he surprised his enemies by his abilities, but he never relaxed
in his energetic opposition to the Klan. Governor Jonathan Worth of North
Carolina described him as "the meanest Yankee who has ever settled among
us. "15 After six years, he did not run for re-election. He had been singu-
larly unsuccessful in business, except as a novelist. In 1879, he headed
north and dedicated his life to civil rights. He became a lecturer, newspaper
man, and a highly successful novelist. He died in France in 1905, after
having received a consular appointment to Bordeaux from President William
McKinley the year after Plessy came down.
Tourg6e put the blame for the Reconstruction disaster not just on the
South, but also on Northern politicians who had betrayed the Negro, the
poor white, and the impoverished planter. One quotation from a Fool's
Errand will illustrate Tourg6e's perception:
After having forced a proud people to yield what they had for more
than two centuries considered a right, . . . they proceeded to outrage a
15. Letter from Jonathan Worth to E. A. Jones (Jan. 7, 1868), in 2 THE CORRESPON-
DENCE OF JONATHAN WORTH, at 1120 (J. G. de Roulhad Hamilton ed., 1909).
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feeling as deep and fervent as the zeal of Islam or the exclusiveness of the
HIndoo caste, by giving to the ignorant, unskilled, and dependent race...
equality of political right! . . .They said to the colored man, in the
language of one of the pseudo-philosophers of that day, "Root, hog, or
die! 16
For some time after the Hayes-Tilden deal and the withdrawal of troops
from the South, from Louisiana and from South Carolina, relatively good
conditions prevailed between the two races. C. Vann Woodward writes:
It was a common occurrence in the 1880s for foreign travelers and
Northern visitors to comment... on the freedom of association between
white and black people in the South. Yankees in particular were unpre-
pared for what they found and sometimes estimated that conditions below
the Potomac were better than those above. Segregation was, after all, a
Yankee invention. It had been the rule in the North before the Civil War
and integration the exception. . . .The age of Jim Crow was still to
come. 17
In Louisiana there were almost as many black voters as white voters
until the Constitution of 1898 disfranchised 98 percent of the African Amer-
ican voters in the state. The disqualified could not pass the grandfather
clause or the understanding clause and other requirements for registration to
vote. Jim Crow came quickly in the late eighties and nineties, even before
the 1898 Constitution. The Louisiana legislature in 1890 enacted a statute
requiring "equal but separate accommodations" on railroad trains.
In New Orleans among whites the term "Creole" refers to whites of
French or Spanish and American descent. Among African Americans the
term includes descendants of blacks (natives or immigrants) and whites, as
it does in the Caribbean, and elsewhere. The Creole Negroes in New
Orleans, many well-educated and descendants of free persons of color,
provided leadership in civil rights activities. On May 18, 1890, eighteen
persons of color under the leadership of Aristide Mary formed the American
Citizens' Equal Rights Association and opposed a bill for separate railroad
cars as "class legislation." "Citizenship," they said, "is national and has no
color." Then, the Louisiana legislators enacted a lottery bill for a favored
class. The establishment of a Louisiana lottery had been a political question
highly fought over in the state legislature. When the legislators finally
approved the lottery, it was no longer necessary for the pro-lottery legisla-
16. TOURGtE, supra note 12, at 137.
17. C. Vann Woodward, The Case of the Louisiana Traveler, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE
SHAPED THE CONSTrM oN 157 (John A. Garraty ed., rev. ed. 1987).
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tors to appease black legislators by holding out to them the quid pro quo of
killing the separate-car statute; thus, a separate-car bill passed requiring
"equal but separate" accommodations on all passenger railways.
Louis A. Martinet, a lawyer, doctor, and newspaper editor, was the
leading spirit in organizing opposition to the bill. Closely associated with
Martinet was Rodolphe Desdunes, a poet and author of a valuable history of
blacks in Louisiana, Nos Hommes at Notre Histoire. In September 1891,
Martinet and Desdunes organized a "Comitd des Citoyens to Test the Consti-
tutionality of the Separate Car Law." To secure legal talent Martinet
solicited Albion Tourg~e, who offered his services pro bono.
Besides accepting Tourg~e's help, the Committee also employed a New
Orleans attorney, James C. Walker, a white criminal lawyer and one time
Republican, to assist Tourg6e. Walker approached the railroads and found
them not uncooperative for a proposed test case. One railroad would not
work with him because it had never enforced the law. The other railroads
were sympathetic because of the extra costs of enforcement. Tourg~e
advised that a "nearly white" person should be chosen for the test case.
Martinet objected that in New Orleans "persons of tolerably fair complexion,
even if unmistakably colored, enjoy a large degree of immunity from the
accursed prejudice." He would go himself, "but I am one of those whom a
fair complexion favors. I go everywhere, in all public places though well-
known all over the city, and never is anything said to me." Tourg~e
expected to argue that the unreasonableness of segregating such persons was
a deprivation of property and a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It was also a stigma of slavery and therefore vio-
lated the Thirteenth Amendment. A few blacks, very few, had an additional
point in wishing to pass as white. As Martinet pointed out, however, these
critics had contributed little to the movement and had been lacking in
education and leadership from the beginning of the community.
On February 24, 1892, Daniel Desdunes, an octoroon, son of Rodolphe
Desdunes, bought a ticket from New Orleans to Mobile. He took a seat in
a white coach. The railroad had instructed the conductor to request
Desdunes to go into the car for colored passengers but not to use force.
Instead, Martinet wrote, "our white passenger" swore out an affidavit.
Desdunes was arrested and charged. Tourg6e and Walker disagreed as to
trial strategy. Walker wanted to challenge the law as a burden on interstate
commerce. Tourg6e wrote him: "What we want is not a verdict of not
guilty, nor a defect in this law but a decision whether such a law can legally"
exist under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. "You are off the
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track," he said. Judge Ferguson sustained Desdunes's plea of not guilty on
the ground that the law did not apply to interstate travel.
Hall v. DeCuir" held that a Louisiana statute prohibiting discrimination
on account of race was invalid because the steamship was operated under a
federally granted coastal license while the ship was on a trip from New
Orleans to Vicksburg and that the state could not intrude into a matter left
to Congress. In Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois," the Supreme Court,
denying the states' power to regulate rates on interstate trips, held that states
could not require racial segregation on interstate trips. Then in Louisville,
N. 0. & Tenn. Ry. v. Mississippi,20 over the dissent of Justices Brewer and
Harlan, the Court dismissed a Commerce Clause objection to a Mississippi
statute requiring all carriers to provide separate cars for whites and blacks
while operating within the state. The Louisiana car statute was similar to the
Mississippi statute.
Desdune's case never reached the Supreme Court of Louisiana. In the
meantime, that court had decided in another case that the Jim Crow law did
not apply to interstate passengers - otherwise it would violate the Com-
merce Clause.
Within a few weeks, Walker arranged another suit, again apparently
with the cooperation of the railroads. Homer A. Plessy, like Desdunes, was
seven-eighths white, and the motions and briefs state that the admixture of
colored blood was not discernible in his complexion. Plessy boarded in New
Orleans a train bound for Covington, Louisiana. He informed the conductor
that he was a Negro as he took his seat in a coach reserved for white pas-
sengers. A New Orleans detective, apparently having previous information
of the plan, arrested Plessy when he refused to move to the Jim Crow car.
The case was assigned to Judge Ferguson who, three weeks later, began by
complimenting Tourg~e and Walker for "great research, learning and abil-
ity," but held the law constitutional. Anytime you hear compliments from
a judge before he renders judgment you know that you have lost the case.
In the Louisiana Supreme Court, Tourg~e wrote the briefs, but he had
not practiced law for some years and Walker argued for Plessy. The Chief
Justice was General Francis T. Nicholls, C.S.A., who had signed the bill
into law as governor two years before.
At that time interracial marriage in Louisiana was allowed. Tourg~e
argued: "A man has surely an absolute right to the companionship and
18. 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
19. 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
20. 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
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society of his wife; and on the other hand, a wife has claims which cannot
be denied on the protection of her husband .... The statute [also] actually
separates parent and child... the bottom rail is on top; the nurse is admitted
to a privilege which the wife herself does not enjoy."
A good deal of the brief is spent attacking the arbitrary, uncontrolled
authority delegated to the conductor. A similar argument was successfully
made in the 1960s based on the delegation of arbitrary discretion to regis-
trars of voters who tested applicants on their understanding of the Constitu-
21tion.
Three weeks after the argument, Justice Charles Erasmus Fenner, for
a unanimous court, upheld the statute. The Thirteenth Amendment gave him
no trouble. He needed to rely only on the Civil Rights Cases,' decided by
the United States Supreme Court in 1883, holding that the Civil War amend-
ments apply only to state discrimination, not to private discrimination. The
Thirteenth Amendment related only to slavery and involuntary servitude;
"denial of equal accommodations . . . [in] inns, public conveyances, and
places of public amusements imposes no badge of slavery or involuntary
servitude." It is interesting that Justice Fenner relied in good part on a pre-
Civil War decision. So too did the United States Supreme Court in 1896 in
Plessy. This case was Roberts v. City of Boston, a noted Massachusetts
school segregation case decided in 1849 by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw,
perhaps the leading state jurist of the time. "It is urged," said Justice Shaw,
that this maintenance of separate schools tends to deepen and perpetuate
the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in
public opinion. This prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and
probably cannot be changed by law. Whether this distinction and preju-
dice, existing in the opinions and feelings of the community, would not be
as effectually fostered by compelling colored and white children to associ-
ate together may well be doubted. . .. '
In January 1893, Tourg~e and Walker filed and were granted an appli-
cation for a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. They
employed Samuel F. Phillips, an old friend of Tourg~e's in Greensboro who
had developed a Washington practice, had been a Solicitor General, and had
argued the Civil Rights Cases. More than three years elapsed before the
21. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aft'd, 380 U.S. 145
(1965).
22. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
23. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849).
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argument took place in April 1896. During those years Jim Crowism had
increased.
The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court at that time was
Melville W. Fuller. Among the Associate Justices was Edward Douglass
White of Louisiana, a Confederate veteran, member of the White League
(the Louisiana equivalent of the Ku Klux Klan), and later Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court. Justice Henry Billings Brown of Lee, Massa-
chusetts, the little town where Tourg6e had lived as an adolescent, wrote the
majority opinion. Tourg6e in his brief emphasized the affirmative aspects
of the Fourteenth Amendment more than he had in the lower court. Even
when I went to law school, the Fourteenth Amendment was regarded as pro-
hibitory only, and I ran into that contention constantly for many years when
I sat on the bench. Basically, Tourgde argued that Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment created a new national citizenship. This is an appealing
argument on the original understanding of the amendments, but the Civil
Rights Cases in 1883 had held that the amendments prohibited state, not
private, discrimination. Even earlier, United States v. Cruikshank,24 not
mentioned in the opinion or the briefs, had held that the federal government
had only limited powers and that the states were the sole guardians of their
citizens' rights. That is close to some recent thinking that an individual
state, not the national government, is the proper guardian of its citizens'
rights.
Tourg~e advanced the Fourteenth Amendment argument that Plessy had
been deprived of property without due process of law. The "property" was
"the reputation of being white.., the master key that unlocks the golden
door of opportunity . . . ," leading to avenues of wealth, prestige, and
opportunity. This argument superficially appears not to be a defense of
blacks against discrimination but a defense of Homer Plessy and others like
him with a large admixture of white blood, who are prejudiced by the
penalties of color. But the argument cuts more deeply. It is an afortiori
argument that even in the case of an educated man with seven-eighths white
blood, the separate but equal doctrine denying access of blacks to association
with whites is an economic barrier in the nature of a deprivation of property.
Indeed this argument was used effectively later in Sweatt v. Painter,'5 before
Brown, to open up the law schools to blacks deprived of referral business
because of lack of access to association with white law students.'
24. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
25. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
26. See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637
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Tourg6_ insisted that the law violated the Thirteenth Amendment as well
as the Fourteenth. "In the history of English jurisprudence, only slavery has
demanded that distinctions in civil rights on the enjoyment of public priv-
ilege be marked by race distinctions." Segregation perpetuates distinctions
"of a servile character, coincident with the institution of slavery."
Tourg~e emphasized the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection as reasserting the precepts of the Declaration of Independence by
granting equality to all citizens.
Why not require all colored people to walk on one side of the street
and whites on the other?... One side of the street may be just as good
as the other .... The question is not as to the equality of the privileges
enjoyed, but the right of the State to label one citizen as white and another
as colored in the common enjoyment of a public highway.
It took the Supreme Court over sixty years to accept Tourg~e's argu-
ment, without any proof of inequality as to buses, drinking fountains, toilets,
parks, lunch counters, and many other things used by blacks and whites.
The vice is Jim Crowism. In Boiling v. Sharpe,' unlike Brown - which
relied on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - the
Supreme Court had to rely on whatever equality would be found in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the District of Columbia
was involved. The two cases were decided the same day - May 17, 1954.
About a month after the argument in Plessy, Justice Brown handed
down the Court's decision establishing the "separate but equal" doctrine. He
followed Justice Fenner's opinion in relying on Justice Shaw in Roberts.
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.'
Those who criticize the Warren Court for its reliance in Brown on sociology
may be surprised to find even more sociological assumptions in Plessy v.
Ferguson. That opinion declares:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinc-
tions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only
result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation .... If one
(1950).
27. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
28. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States
cannot put them upon the same plane. 9
Justice Harlan was the only member of the Court to dissent. "In my
opinion," he predicted, "the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove
to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred
Scott case. "I Justice Harlan declared:
[TIn view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here.
Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. . . .The thin disguise of "equal" accommodations for
passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the
wrong this day done.31
When any person becomes discouraged by what appears to be the
failure of African Americans today to recognize the extent of the advances
in civil rights since the Brown case in 1954, I suggest that person bear in
mind the prophetic words of Albion W. Tourg~e in 1890.
It is easy for us to excuse ourselves for the wrongs of slavery, but
day by day it is growing harder for a colored man to do so; and it is
simply to state a universal fact of human nature to declare that a great and
lasting wrong like slavery done to a whole people grows blacker and
darker for generations as they go away from it. The educated grandchild
of a slave who looks back into the black pit of slavery will find little
excuse for the white Christian civilization which forbade marriage,
crushed aspiration, and after two centuries and a half offered the world as
the fruits of Christian endeavor five millions of bastard sons and
daughters - the product of a promiscuity enforced by law and upheld by
Christian teachings. Slavery will be a more terrible thing to the Negro a
hundred years hence than it was to the calloused consciousness of his
nameless father .... 32
I admire Harlan. But I do not go all the way with his strong words. I
have said on several occasions in one form or another: The Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments are both color-blind and color-conscious. These
amendments took cognizance of the Founding Fathers' decision in 1787 not
29. Id. at 551-52.
30. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 559, 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. Albion W. Tourg~e, Address at the First Mohonk Conference on the Negro
Question in 1890, at 11 (1880), quoted in Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro
Freedom, 21 RuTGERs L. REv. 387, 440-41 (1966).
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to face up directly to the issue of slavery - in the interest of putting together
a viable national government and creating what is, in effect, national
citizenship. I see these amendments as reversing Dred Scott, bringing the
Declaration of Independence into the Constitution, making freed men and
their descendants free men and full American citizens. Justice must be
color-conscious as well as color-blind - color-conscious when it becomes
necessary to remedy the evils of past discrimination based on color or to
prevent new evils of discrimination based on color.
Some would call this affirmative action.
